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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
EMINENT DOMAIN-ExcEss CONDEMNATION.-The City of Cincinnati filed
condemnation proceedings under the excess condemnation provision in the
Ohio Constitution, reading as follows: "A municipality may appropriate
property for public use or acquire an excess over that actually to be occu-
pied and may sell such excess with such restrictions as shall be appropriate
to preserve the improvement." Const. Ohio art. 8 sec. 10. The recital
of purpose in the city's petition was very vague. In the Circuit Court of
Appeals the condemnation proceedings were enjoined at the suit of the
condemnees. City of Cincinnati v. Vester (C. C. A. 6, 1929) 33 F. (2d)
242. The result reached was passed upon an interpretation of the city's
act as an attempt at recoupment of the cost of the improvement from the
sale of the excess property. The state constitutional provision was held
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Up-
on writ of certiorari the Supreme Court refused to declare the state pro-
vision unconstitutional upon conjectures as to what the city might be at-
tempting to accomplish. The decree below was affirmed upon the ground
that the public purpose in each condemnation proceeding must be stated
in exact terms in the petition of the city. Failure to conform to this re-
quirement is a denial of due process. City of Cincinnati v. Vester (1930)
281 U. S. 439.
That there must be an exact public use stated in a condemnation peti-
tion is firmly established. Forest Preserve Dist. v. Jirsa (Ill. 1929) 168
N. E. 690; Young v. City of Gurdon (1925) 169 Ark. 399, 275 S. W. 890;
Wilson v. St. Johns (Fla. 1929) 123 So. 527.
The Circuit Court of Appeals classified the purposes of excess condem-
nation into three categories, namely: (1) recoupment of the increase in
value due to the improvement; (2) avoidance of remnant lots; (3) pres-
ervation and amplification of the public improvement. As regards the
constitutionality of excess condemnation the Supreme Court, in common
with the majority of tribunals dealing with the subject, appears to be sus-
picious of recoupment, for it says, " . . . the importance of the defi-
nition of purpose would be even greater in the case of taking property
not directly to be occupied by a proposed public improvement. ."
City of Cincinnati v. Vester (1930) 281 U. S. 439, 447. See also In re
Monroe Avenue (1929) 227 App. Div. 123, 237 N. Y. S. 147; Bond v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (1911) 116 Md. 683, 82 Atl. 978;
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Philddelphia (1911) 242 Pa.
47, 88 Atl. 904; Carpenter v. City of Buffalo (1930) 244 N. Y. S. 242;
Opinion of the Justices (1912) 204 Mass. 609, 91 N. E. 405. The court
further affirmed the accepted view that the determination of the ade-
quacy of the public purpose in each case is a judicial question. Rindge
v. County of Las Angelos (1923) 262 U. S. 700; In re City of Rochester
(1917) 100 Misc. 241, 165 N. Y. S. 1026; Board of Education of School
Dist. v. Harper (1922) 191 N. Y. S. 273.
The trend of judicial opinion in regard to avoidance of remnant lots
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and preservation of the improvement by means of excess condemnation is
much more liberal. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Philadel-
phia, above; Hunt Drainage Dist. v. Harness (1925) 317 Ill. 292, 148 N. E.
44; Rogers v. Breisacher (1925) 231 Mich. 317, 204 N. W. 112.
Excess condemnation is used extensively in Europe. REPORT, COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION (1915) 53. Today California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York, Rhode Island, Ohio, and Wisconsin have constitutional provisions
for excess condemnation; and Maryland, Illinois, New Jersey, and Vir-
ginia have statutory provisions. HUBBARD AND HUBBARD, OUR CITIES To-
DAY AND TomioRRow (1929). J. G. G., '32.
EMINENT DOmAIN-PUBLIC PURPOsE-GoLF COURSE FOR STATE UNIvER-
sITr.-The University of Michigan instituted condemnation proceedings
against certain lands for a golf course. The course was to be owned by
a non-profit corporation whose purpose was the furtherance of the physi-
cal well-being of the students at the University but which was controlled
by the Board of Regents. Held, the University could condemn the land
since the purpose is an integral part of the board program of education.
People v. Pommerening (Mich. 1930) 220 N. W. 194.
The appropriation of lands for public educational purposes is a just
exercise of the right of eminent domain. Board of Education V. Hack-
man (1871) 48 Mo. 243. The taking of land adjacent to a school building
for a place of recreation and exercise is a taking for a public use. State
ex rel. School District v. Superior Court (1912) 69 Wash. 189, 124 Pa. 484.
Also is the condemning of land for a gymnasium or athletic field. Kern
County Union High School District v. McDonald (1919) 180 Cal. 7,. 179
Pac. 180. In granting the school board the right to condemn land for a
high school athletic field as part of an educational institution the court
stated, "More properly defined a modern educational institution embraces
those things which experience has taught us are essential to the mental,
moral and physical development of the child." Commissioners of Dist. of
Col. v. Shannon & Lucks Construction Co. (D. C. Col. 1922) 17 F. (2d)
219.
The power of a university to condemn lands for a dormitory has been
upheld as constituting a public use within the meaning of the constitution.
Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University (Ind. 1929) 168 N. E. 529. Also
has the power to appropriate lands to be used as a lawyers' club and dor-
mitory. People v. Brooks (1923) 224 Mich. 45, 194 N. W. 602. In Knapp
v. State (1914) 125 Minn. 194, 145 N. W. 966, the action of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota condemning land for a railway to connect the Univer-
sity campus and farm to the line of a common carrier was upheld.
In view of the wide approval given by the courts to the condemnation
of land for state universities' recreational facilities, the decision in the
instant case does not seem to stretch unduly the category of "public
uses." T. L., '32.
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